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¶ As we found in our historical studies over the last
120 years, almost all phenomena that man produces in the
world are intimately inter-related. In all the different
fields of his endeavors in a given period certain common
denominators prevail. That has formerly been the general
ideas of such a period or the culture of such a period,
whatever one wanted to call it. We want to find out what
are those things that cause man to take a new position
towards reality, to make a new stand in the world. And
we suspect that in our time the conditions of the world of
man have changed more than in other times we knew — except
perhaps once, at the time of the breakdown of the mythical
world. So, for us those common denominators are still un-
known factors. We still consider them to be factors to be
looked for and to be found. One thing is sure, namely,
that the reactions or actions of man in his different fields
of endeavor have similarities in any given epoch. That is
the thing we go on.
 How, in our time we thought that we would first try
to find differences from former times — namely, things
that seem to us new and funny and somehow things we really
are not accustomed to, that shock us more or less. Going
into a few of those phenomena, as you discussed them out
of your own experience, you found that they all seem to
indicate a change of condition in very fundamental matters
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— namely, for instance, in our concept of time. Now human
beings cannot exist and cannot act without certain concepts
of time and space. That much is clear. But if in those
fundamental matters a change takes place and that change
is not recognized early enough, then the confusion that comes
out of that is constantly growing. It is not merely a matter,
this time, of changing, let’s say, our position towards
nature. True, it changed considerably. If we try to find
out how our knowledge of nature differs from all the former
concepts of man of nature, we see that there is a difference
like day and night. It is a change that is absolutely over-
whelming. That would already be enough all of a sudden,
but as soon as we try to study that and to find what might
have brought about this change in our concept of nature, we
have to account for certain factors that brought about this
absolutely outstanding and singular development of modern
science — a development that has never been witnessed be-
fore and that came so much into the foreground that it for
a time dominated and still dominates all other fields of
our human endeavor. If you ask any Asiatic man, a highly
cultured one, what is the difference between Asian and Euro-
pean culture, he will always answer, ›There is only one
difference; the role of science in Western culture, the
predominate role of science that seems to overrule every
other condition of man, that seems to take into its stride,
so to speak, every other value that man ever considered to
Heinrich Blücher – Papers 
Box 2, Folder 8
Bard College (Annandale-on-Hudson), Stevenson Library




be necessary for him.‹ If they would accuse us of fanaticism
then they might very well say that this has been since the
Baroque time, since the development of modern science in
the West, an age of steadily growing scientific fanaticism.
We take science fanatically. It is something that takes
more of our life than anything else.
 This strange phenomenon in itself has to be explained,
and here it is easy because science is first concerned with
physical phenomena, with phenomena which really, as far as
we can be objective at all, can be objectively stated, and
objectively communicated. Those physical phenomena especial-
ly are bound in their very discovery to the concept of space
and time, but mainly to space. Bo a change in the concept
of space that somehow, somewhere, sometime occurred, if we
could trace it, would give us a good account of the opening
up of those tremendous possibilities of scientific discovery
as we have witnessed them since the beginning of the so-called
scientific age. Fantastically this new concept of space
overcame us, so to speak, at a moment of despair. We still
believed in the fact that the cosmos was well ordered for
us, that every location that a piece of matter had in the
cosmos was, either by God or by the inherent spirit of the
cosmos itself, very well ordered and ordered for us in or-
der, so to speak, to put us into a position of absolute su-
periority where we could feel wonderful and fine. Since
mythical time there has not been a single concept of nature
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where, whatever form it took, this basic guarantee was not
given — namely, that man has his place in nature and that
everything is well ordered for him. Even in the mythical
thinking of the Indians with those millionfold worlds, they
all were very well ordered. Likewise in the thinking of
Abraham with this world created by God, so to speak, out
of iron that will hold forever, and man placed in it for a
definite purpose. It was the same with the Christian con-
cept, and finally with the scientific-metaphysical concept
— let’s say, of Spinoza to take the greatest one — that
still tried to assure us, for the last time, of this inner
certainty. But in the meantime the simple discovery that
the earth is not the center of the world had been made,
and with it this whole system of thought that for thousands
and thousands of years had prevailed broke down entirely un-
til we finally found ourselves in such a state of despair as
to nature that we could answer only by a definite counter-
attack.
 The definite counter-attack was to conquer nature, to
rule nature, to make nature our slave, to trample on the neck
of nature, so to speak, in order to be assured that we are
still the masters, that we still have our place within
nature. This came about out of despair, namely, out of
philosophical despair in a truth that we always took for
granted — namely, that we were welcome in the world, that
we were well received in the world, that everything in the
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world was our brother or was related, to us and was just there
in order to have us as nice little children here in this
world, to make us welcome in it. This feeling we lost and
we began to panic that it might be quite the opposite, that
it might be that we do not fit at all into nature, that na-
ture is nothing but a permanent danger to the existence of
human beings. We finally thought, now we live in the middle
of a catastrophe, the catastrophe of a permanently exploding
and expanding universe. Any significance that was in all
our concepts of nature, namely, metaphysical significance,
significance as to the sense that our life makes, the meaning
of life, has gone out of this concept. A nature that seems
so disorderly — not ordered by God for our nice purposes,
nor ordered itself in a way that will always help us and be
our brother or servant — that took away the innermost cer-
tainty that human beings had.
 From then on uncertainty becomes the main feature of
our thinking about our life. It seemed formerly that if we
only could discover nature in its real orderly context, how
it hangs together, if we really could finally find the laws
of nature, then we would have achieved much — we would have
found also the meaning of being. And suddenly this illusion
exploded, and it exploded so much in our time that if we
talk with a modern scientist, strictly philosophically, let’s
say an atom physicist, and ask him the question, ›Don’t you
yourself think that the more you know about nature, and the
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more we will know about nature, mathematically to be formu-
lated, and the more opportunities we have about how things
in the physical world are going, the less we will know of
what it all is?‹ And he would agree with it. At the same
speed at which we gain the knowledge about how those things
work we lose the last illusions of what they might be. We
don’t even know any more if we can apply terms like matter
and energy, which are old terms. We do not see any differ-
ence between matter and energy any more in the real scienti-
fic context. The signs for it are that scientists, and they
bewail it most, lost the possibility to talk to us. They
cannot put the picture that they have of nature into words
any more and everybody who has not the knowledge of higher
mathematics is in danger of not understanding what they are
talking about. And they regret that most. They find that
as they make concepts in words they have to reject them, and
they are more and more reduced to indicating mathematically
mere occurrences of which they don’t know the nature whether
they have any significance, let alone meaning, but only how
they usually occur and what we can possibly do with them.
 So this triumph of science which has made it possible
that we have this age of a mass population — because without
those discoveries of science we would never have been able
to nourish on the American soil as many people as we have
now — this our growing fanatical about science has, at the
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same time, taken away from us the meaning of life. We can
believe in science, but then we know nothing about science.
If we really know science like the good scientists of our
time, then we know exactly the limits of science and that
those limits cannot be crossed. We will not be able to find
any meaning in those things any more. We cannot even find
causes because the words cause and effect lose their meaning,
too, in natural events. We can only find chains of occurren-
ces which might run in one or the other direction. We are
not even able to find an indication for time any more in the
natural events because we do not find a direction for time.
 That is the status of today and we have paid for it
with an entire negligence of all the other factors — one
of the deepest reasons why we cry out for help now in our
situation, saying, ›My God, we must go back to one concept of
the world that gives us back an amount of certainty, at least,
because if this scientific picture prevails, we ourselves
will be nothing but chains of occurrences and we will start
to handle ourselves as chains of occurrences and not as hu-
man beings.‹ And we have. The five million Jews that were
slaughtered in Germany under totalitarian rule have been
handled as mere chains of occurrences and most people who
did it didn’t even have a qualm about what they did because
they were convinced that they acted scientifically in a
chain of unavoidable scientific events, scientific fanati-
cism can be made one of the most cruel weapons of destruction
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of humanity in our time if we do not see the self-knowledge
of our modern science which knows already that it is strictly
limited — limited mainly as to meaning. It can never reach
meaning. This dissolution is the basis for the so-called nihil-
istic developments, the development of nihilistic thinking in
modern time.
 We found in our discussion period that two things seem
to prevail in all our symptoms: namely, a change of our
opinion of time and space and a change in relations. Those are
very fundamental things because human beings cannot live and
exist without making relations and being in relations, nor
can they exist without having definite concepts of time and
space. A change that occurs in those things must be a change
that influences everything in the world, everything in their
actions. That is why we think we have two basic issues at
hand here. How do they relate? We talked about this chang-
ing concept of time and found that in contrast to all other
concepts of time we ever had in different civilizations, ours
is a concept that is entirely made without any connection
to eternity. It is perhaps the clearest concept of time we
ever had but using it means that we become the victims of
time and not the masters of time.
 If we abstract from our inner time, from our human
aspect of time entirely and try to define time only in terms
of outwardly observed phenomena, then we have the definition
we have found here, namely that time is nothing but a flux
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of events, that to talk about something like the present
is entirely senseless because a thing never exists. In
that sense such things as a past or a real future do not
exist. The present exists only as a moment; this moment
comes and is gone already. There is no real time and space
present there. So if we live in that flux, then we live as
all things in the world live: namely, within that flux,
and we will even lose the sense of time.
 And we have to ask ourselves how did we get it in
the first place — for all concepts of time, however they
might have changed, there must be one common denominator;
namely, how could man get any concept of time at all, how
could it come to his consciousness. We know we have our
body experience, we know we have our other experiences.
There are always indications of time. That would not mean
that man can have any concept of time whatsoever; he may
not be able to formulate experiences like that. He must
have some other capability. This capability is related
to what we call the concept of eternity. Let us abstract
entirely and reject entirely any concept of eternity, I
mean as it has been presented to us up to now — namely,
let us say in the Socratic manner, ›Why should we talk
about a concept for which we have no real experience to
go on? What do we know about eternity? We cannot know
anything about eternity. Men come from nowhere and go into
nowhere; we have never known it and we will never know it —
that is what we have to cope with all the time. So any kind
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of concept of eternity could only be thought or mythical
imagination or poetical imagination. We have not found any
reality that would correspond to such a thing as eternity.‹
That is true, but then the question arises: ›If that is so
how could the idea of something we call eternity ever arise
in the human mind?‹ Is the human mind such that it can dream
out of itself, without any reason, a concept of something of
which it knows absolutely nothing? It would be a strange
capability and very worthwhile to look into — if it had this
capability. Or we can ask the other question: ›Is there
not perhaps something which is a real experience that can
teach about a concept like eternity?‹
 All things we know, all events if we want to call
them that, or occurrences, are in time; none of them, being
entirely in time, has a concept of time. Only we have a
concept of time, human beings. Might it be because we are
not entirely contained in time. Is there a difference be-
tween being and having. Animals, even animals, do not
have time, they are in time. The fact that they don’t have
time is shown by a very simple thing — that by being trained,
that means being put in a flux of time, a dog can be made to
come here every Friday at 6:20, to show up in this classroom.
I put the dog into an experience of a flux of time events.
I can do this if the dog is mine, because he might want to
be with me or, if it is a stranger, by means of giving the
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dog food at a certain time and place. The dog will show up
because he will be aware of this flux of time. The dog,
under the condition that it continues to like the food
offered and doesn’t change to another classroom because
somebody offered him something he liked better, under this
condition the dog will show up. Being within that flux of
time, the dog may not be able to change it — that means not
to come. We come here to this class and we are here now be-
cause we intended to do so and we could intend to do and
make ourselves present here and now just because of our
capability not to be here and now if we want to — which
means that no flux of time or events is able, by containing
us, to bring us here. We can get out of it by a mere act of
decision. We can also keep time exactly, as we do, and we
are here approximately on the hour, even I, and start a
class — which means we have the time. And having time
means not to be time, not to be in time.
 How do we get that strange capability? I said we
can be here and now, and that is what, as to time and space,
makes all the difference in the world — namely the difference
of a human being from the world, from all the other world.
To be here means to find a definite location in space. We 
find definite locations in space by
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which we even outdo the animals who live according to and
in a flux of time and in a definite space. The birds that
migrate to the south live in a definite space — they are
moved by the space. We move absolutely freely in space, ac-
cording to motives, decisions and reason. Our night fighters
during a war have the ability to locate over enemy territory
any spot they want — that means to be able to locate. We
can locate — that means we are not entirely in space; we are
above space. There is a capability in us that can use space
and have space and not merely be in space — which also
means, in a way, to get out of a given space and into another
space condition. [Our boys] start to dream about outer space
and inter-stellar space and so on. This concept of space
has terribly changed even for the boys already. We are aware
how much we have gained in handling space. So it is with
time and we talked about that already. Our difference from
all other things in the world as to space is the simple
one that we ourselves are location, we are the here. Where-
ever we are can be ›here‹, this point in space which we oc-
cupy and that is the ›here‹. Everything else is not the
›here‹; it is only there in the world — somewhere in space.
As soon as I can order it in space, then the thing gets,
in a way, to have human qualities — that means they are or-
dered by human will.
 That is our performance in space. In time we have
another one — namely, we are now here. What does that ›now‹
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mean? That ›now‹ is not now as I use the word to describe
this moment which we can never find in the time concept it-
self. This now, here now, two hours of a session, a stretch
of time which we ourselves voluntarily cut out and design
— this is our ›now‹, this is our present. It goes much
farther. The very fact that a human being by being conscious,
be being a thinking being, is now the being that he was before
and already the one he will be tomorrow, the consistency of
a human being during a stretch of life, a span of life of
which he is aware, which he is — this is presence. That
is the thing that in time itself does not exist. It exists
only in us and by us. We set it. This phenomenon of pre-
sence is the reality which we experience that always made
us say there is such a thing as eternity — namely, something
that seems to be entirely different from time; timing, so to
speak, is entirely different from time because it uses time.
That real experience that everyone always had without think-
ing it through is the reason why we could dream concepts
of eternity, immortality, because we always felt that among
all other things in the world human beings are absolutely
different — and they are different in fundamental matters
like time. They are not contained in time; they are not,
so to speak, contained in space.
 The development of the concept of eternity or immor-
tality has been a very unclear one through all the ages, but
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it shows surprisingly a certain strict philosophical develop-
ment. The concept of eternity was a concept of infinity of
the time concept itself up to the time of the Hebrew and the
Christian religions. The Hebrew and then especially the
Christian religion tried to build a concept of eternity that
is absolutely different from time, has no time indication
whatsoever — not like the Greek concept that says time goes
on in infinity, but an absolutely different quality. Of
course, that cannot be illustrated. As soon as we try to
illustrate that, as for instance Dante does, we come into
poetical imagination. The philosophical value of it is that
here was the fact recognized that we live in time but by
something that is entirely different from time. We do not
live by time; we live only in time. We do not live by space;
we live only in space. All other things exist in space, in
time and by space and by time, in certain definite fluxes of
them. Not we. The recognition of the absolute difference
of man, his loneliness in the in the world, his not being ab-
solutely connected, is the one that makes it possible for
him to connect himself out of will.
 This connection we call a relation. At birth the
thing, so to speak, is put into a relation with others.
That includes the bees in the beehive, that includes every
animal alive, except the animal life that is left in contact
with man because then it is already established by man and
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gets another indication. Otherwise they are entirely con-
tained. Whatever unity they ever had, for instance the unity
of the beehive, does not mean that those are relations.
They are not relations, they are related functions that make
a whole. Relation means that everybody, every part in this
community — and it has to be a community — is aware that
relations prevail and that he also makes relations. Relation
is a very productive thing of human beings and we cannot use
it scientifically, saying those things are related to each
other — this book, for instance, lying on this table. They
are not related. They are just together in a definite space,
but they are not related at all. A relation would require
that I put a table here, that I put the book on it. That
is a relation because there is a purpose to it. I established
that relation, not those things. They cannot establish any
relation whatsoever. They are just together in space if
they are by themselves. That makes a tremendous difference
for the use of the word relation. We say those things are
related only in a manner of speaking. In human affairs we
really establish the relation.
 It is one of the signs of our time that we mix that
up. We really think that if a society is created — let’s
say a totalitarian society where a unity is established so
that from the leader on everybody must act uniformly as soon
as it is required — that then a society is established that
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is through and through related. But just the opposite is
the case — namely, it is a society where all possible rela-
tions are broken and destroyed and where only one relation
is established — the relation from top to bottom; otherwise
all real relations are destroyed. Any act of spontaneity
is destroyed and with spontaneity begins the possibility of
human beings to establish relations.
 In the mythical world of which we were speaking things
looked still different because we are born into certain so-
ciety relations there. It is still the mother’s womb where
the beginning of real relations between human persons can
start. It can develop only to a certain limit and then it
will be stopped by the belief of this society; but it can de-
velop. In a modern totalitarian society, it is entirely des-
troyed. This concept of power that we have as to a modern
totalitarian state is quite different from the concept of
power that seems to prevail in a mythical society. There
everybody was within that society; here in the totalitarian
society nobody is. The so-called society is an abstraction
that is over everybody, is imposed on everybody. One cannot
really live in it, it is merely a pattern, a continuous pattern
of imposed conduct. It makes human beings lose all the capa-
bilities to conduct their own life. That means they are en-
tirely conditioned; they have been robbed of the human quali-
ty to be conditioners also. They cannot condition anything;
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they are merely conditioned. That means they have not the
possibility of establishing relations — they cannot have
it because establishing relations is our first act of free-
dom already in childhood. When we come out of relations we
are involved in with mother and father and come to our first
consciousness, we accept this relationship. Whereas before
we were only it, we now accept it with an agreement and we
try by our efforts to reinforce that relation, to do some-
thing to establish it as an active relation. That is the be-
ginning of free action. To take that free action out means
to take every human possibility away. If we cannot establish
free relations, we cannot love. Then love cannot be the mo-
tive of living with somebody but only usefulness — namely,
the usefulness for society or whatever we like — imposed
on human beings under such conditions that they cannot re-
sist.
 So, by this catastrophe of despair, suddenly seeing
that nature does not give us this basic guarantee we thought
it gave us, followed by a tremendous development of science
that overrules all other concerns of man, we can, so to speak,
tumble into the development of a society that becomes more
and more automatic and rules out our creative powers. And
then finally, as happened in Germany, a force comes along,
just drawing the consequences from this development, and
shows us that it can really be done entirely, that we can be
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fixed in space so completely that, e.g., we cannot pass an
›iron curtain‹, or cannot use space in order to write a let-
ter to a relative in another country. We can be fixed in
space and moved in space by others. I belong to a people
that say in Russia that suddenly the White Russians that were
of German descent centuries ago, a war occurs, we are consid-
ered to be dangerous. We are certainly not White Russians
any more but we live somewhere in Siberia and there we are
fixed. The space in which we have to live is given to us; it
is assigned to us. We have no choice. The time also. We
can be made to think like apes. Man might not have sprung
from the ape, which is very doubtful and the scientists doubt
it now — but one thing is sure: man can be made an ape. And
they try by making him lose those qualities which we are
after in this course and which we try to reassemble and be-
come aware of because we see we are in danger of losing cer-
tain apparently fundamental qualities of man which make man
man. And if we are in danger of losing them we have every
reason to look out for them and to find out finally what they
really are. We have seen that we have another concept and
another relation to time and to space than things have. We
should stress that and look out that we, for heaven sakes,
preserve our capability to have that; and that means that
the question of whether somebody gets a passport into the
United States is of concern to all humanity, to all human
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beings who do not want to impair freedom except for absolutely
necessary reasons. Otherwise everybody should be interested
in seeing that the freedom of a human being in the most sim-
ple form — namely, to be able to go free through space as he
wants — is not impaired, because we might be the next
ones who are asked to stay in certain fixed places and be un-
able to move any more and lose our basic human capacities.
In that sense a great politician, one of the last great
statesmen in the world, Clemenceau, in the time of the Drey-
fus affair, being neither an anti-Semite nor a pro-Semite but
just a statesman, has said, ›The matter of [one, the matter of 
all] in a republic.‹1 — and it is.
 We are going far beyond politics here; we are trying
to see that in our time permanent events are taking place,
voluntary events — but those are only the consequences —
and mostly involuntary events that take away from us step
by step certain qualities without which human beings are
everything else but not human beings — and that means to
destroy man. That is the reason we pursue those things.
People become especially concerned in times of world war or
revolutions, but as soon as that is not the case and there is
only ›cold war‹ or something like that, we have the illusion
that we are back to normal, business as usual — but we aren’t.
If such a condition is there, then we get a little bit alarmed
and ask ourselves about those things. We do it merely philo-
1 Reference unclear.
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sophically here — that means we handle principles whatever
the situation might be. We want to find out the danger man
himself is in. Frightened religious people come along and
say, ›Yes, it is an apocalyptic time; we live in the time of
the anti-Christ.‹ This is a wonderful illusion because it
would mean that after the anti-Christs come there will be
order again. We live in a much harder time: we live in a
time of anti-man — namely, in a time where there are certain
men and societies and parties who have discovered that man
can be ruined and made into something else — that means that
the creative capabilities of man which make him man can be
taken away from him. And this type who recognizes that tries
to design a new great figure compared with which Satan or the
anti-Christ is just child’s play — namely, anti-man and anti-
human society, a society that does not recognize any human
qualities whatsoever, beginning with the fact that the son
has to deny his father if the father has said in secret
anything against Hitler or against Stalin, breaking that re-
lationship and so all through society. De-humanization and
depersonalization of man, making them mere factors, factors
to be operated with — this is the inherent danger of our time.
 That all this could be possible shows the great chance
of our time — namely, that it could be possible means that
the human mind has not yet discovered itself and its powers
to the full. The development in which the human mind tried
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to establish itself as a creative force is not yet completed
and just this mortal danger we are in shows us the opportuni-
ty and the first absolute opportunity to discover just that
thing: namely, the structure of the human mind itself as
to its real human indications and possibilities. The dan-
ger we are in shows that we did not make use of those possi-
bilities sufficiently — otherwise we could not come into
that mortal danger. We haven’t been aware of them enough.
Becoming fully aware of them, or at least to initiate that,
is then the task of philosophy in such a time. Or it would
be the task of religion to lead us back to security if that
is possible — I doubt it. Anyhow being in philosophy I have
to do my job: namely, to try to become more aware of the
possibilities we did not use.
 This is also the reason, the innermost reason why we
chose the figures we have chosen for this course. Not only
that the time in a way was the only one which was similar
because fundamental changes took place, changes that nobody
in time recognized, which took place over a period of hun-
dreds and hundreds of years before they really showed their
consequences — not only that, but with the first of them,
Lao-tze, we have the first phenomenon of a real free think-
er — i.e., a man who starts to ask questions. And with
this asking of questions, suddenly taking nothing for grant-
ed after humanity in the mythical world has taken everything
for granted, suddenly taking nothing for granted but asking
questions of the world. With that a first act of what we
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could call the self-liberation of the human mind has set in
and from there on, in a straight line up to Jesus of Naza-
reth, we have one great thinker after another from approxi-
mately 800 B.C. to the year 1, who was concerned with exactly
the same thing — namely, Is there a possibility of the self-
consciousness — and that means self-liberation — of the
human mind? The fight for freedom in that time can show us
possibilities for our fight for freedom — namely, freedom
not in the sense of something that has been given to us and
now seems to be taken away from us step by step, i.e., free-
dom of choice mainly; but freedom of creative activities of
man. That is what they were concerned with, with those crea-
tive activities, and that is why we try to ask them questions.
Because they were the first ones who asked questions of
the world and did not take anything for granted any more.
 This development of original liberation of the human
mind is a strict philosophical one. The fact that on the
teaching of Zarathustra a religion was later built, that on
Buddha one of the great world religions was built, that Je-
sus of Nazareth is believed to have been the Son of God — all
those things do not concern us here. We consider them as
philosophers. We ask only: ›Are there a few original thoughts
in everyone of them which we either have forgotten or have
not developed enough, thoughts which might help us to re-
establish or establish in a better way our human position in
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the world in the face of the danger that this human position
seems to be taken away from us?‹ We are interested in only
those original thoughts which we can still use, which are in
us and unite us with people like that. No historical study
of their development, only the absolute new beginnings. All
those men have been beginners.
 St. Augustine once said, ›God created man in order that
there might be a beginning.‹2 We have talked in philosophy
for hundreds and hundreds and thousands of years now about
beginning. Every philosopher wanted to start at the begin-
ning and everyone of them thought he could never start with
the beginning because he did not know what the beginning
was and that even science now can never find a beginning.
So we ask again the question that we asked as to eternity:
›Where do we get such a strange concept as beginning from
if there hadn’t been apparently a beginning?‹ We have it,
namely, because we are beginners. Man is the only phenomen-
on in the world that starts things to happen out of himself.
The permanent human experience with beginning is what makes
him dream up great metaphysical stories of how the beginning
of the world might have been, and all that.
 But there is one reality in it and that reality we
are concerned with: namely. What is this quality in man that
is the quality of beginning? How can he have it? How does
he do it? Those are questions we have in mind — not, so to
speak, mystical questions. Mythical thought and mystical
2 De Civitate Dei (The city of God), XII, 20/21. See also Arendt, 
Hannah: The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago Press, 1958, p. 
177.
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thought and religious thought and metaphysical thought is of
concern to us only to find whether there is a grain of real
truth — namely, a thought that applies to every human being.
The sensing of a creative reality that might be in every
human being. So we will handle, for instance, the question
of the Trinity, which is one of the most disputed questions
in theological thinking. We are not concerned with the im-
passes theological thinking runs into and has to run into if
it tries to show that three can be one — it can never be
shown. But what we are interested in is how can such an
idea ever enter the human mind. Is there a reality and real
experience of man that indicates that such a thing might be
possible? There is such an inner reality and we will come to
it. So we do it with eternity, so we do it with relations.
We are only interested in those realities of human thinking
that are related to realities of human life and experience
— nothing else.
 In that sense those figures will be assembled around
certain problems. Fantastically also they are assembled most-
ly in the chronological sequence because it seems to have
happened that one step was made after the other, though none
of those people had any idea that their forerunners ever
lived — which would be only another indication more of the
unity of the structure of the human. And we are after this
very unity of the structure — that certain things are done
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by man according to an innermost will and to a certain struc-
tural relationship between all the creative capacities of man
which grow on each other and must exist in a kind of a con-
stellation that can be used for creative purposes.
 But we have to ask an abstract question first and
that is the question: ›What is a question?‹ A question can
only be made by somebody who is free not to agree. That
would be the first condition for being able to question at all.
Nobody who is not free to disagree could ever ask a question.
There must be a fundamental human quality to disagree, to
distrust, not to take for granted. From this the quality,
the conscious quality of raising a question arises. Now
the question is, ›What is the question of all questions‹, or,
let’s say, ›the source of all questions?‹ If we look into
all theories of being that have ever been made by metaphysi-
cians who claim to know what being is, over-all being, the
all of being, then we will finally find that they all go to
pieces because none of them was able to explain what is is
— and ›what is is‹ is a much more important question than
what being is. What do we mean when we say this thing is —
what does that word ›is‹ mean? That can overthrow most meta-
physical concepts, this one question, that claim they know
what being is because as soon as one asks them this question,¶
they say, »Well, but that would just be what counts.
We would have to know that in order even to begin an inquiry
¶ [Audio file 
ends here.]
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into what being might be. We don’t know unless we know what
is is.
 So it is with questions. There is one question at
the source of all questions — why? What is why? Why are
we able to ask why? What is this? And, how is this? are
easy to ask as soon as we ask. Why? What does that indica-
te — somebody who can ask why? He asks for an account, an
account shall be given to him. There is a tremendous arro-
gance in this question. The question is, so to speak, aimed
directly at the sense and meaning of being itself. Somebody
turns up in this world, a being, and asks: Why? Why is that?
Why should I do that? Why? He seems to be a judge, claims
judgment power — this being. If the question is justified,
that would mean that this being is the judge of the world
and that he has been born to be the judge of the world because
he asks this inquisatory question: Why? We will try to find
if the question is justified — perhaps it is just an illusion
of ours that we can ask this question. We ask, we never get
an answer, it doesn’t lead us anywhere to ask questions like
that — as many people say, ›Drop that philosophical question,
›Why?‹ and you will feel better. You will never get an an-
swer to this question so you will feel better, you will live
better, you won’t be worried.‹
 The trouble is only that if everybody really would
forget the question, ›Why?‹, in a short time we would not be
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able to ask the question, ›What is that?‹ and, ›How is that?‹
either because we would have lost the capability of question-
ing. It depends upon this eternal question. So Ortega Y
Gasset was quite right with his warning. He wrote in the
Twenties, ›My dear friends, you think you can become entire-
ly practical. You think you cannot give grants any more to
students who want to study atom physics and mathematics
only for the sake of knowing it. You give them grants only
if they can show that they are near immediate results. But
the leaders are those who will never get results, who will
only open up questions for others who might get results.
And if you lost this elite — then I prophecy to you — if
you keep on that way in science, in 200 years none of you
will be able even to fix an automobile any more.‹3
 This sounds paradoxical, but it is exactly that way,
and the reason for it is if we get used in our education to
despising people who ask this question, ›Why?‹, and if we
are really able to discard it, then we would lose the de-
rived quality of asking any question and we would lose our
civilization. It depends on apparently useless people —
on two kinds of useless people: people who are philosophi-
zing — no use for them whatsoever in a real practical so-
ciety — and people who do not ask the question, ›Why?‹
but answer it constantly without even asking it – by works
of art — the artist. Both are absolutely useless human
3 Referring to: Ortega y Gasset, José: The Revolt of the masses, 
1929/1930. The controversial thesis of Ortega y Gasset is later 
known as the Ortega-Hypothesis.
Heinrich Blücher – Papers 
Box 2, Folder 8
Bard College (Annandale-on-Hudson), Stevenson Library




beings considered from a point of view of mere practicality.
But the fact that the earning of the laborer in the United
States, the constant rise of wages, the nice living that the
middle class has in the United States depends entirely on
those performers who opened up the questions. They are still
robbing them, so to speak, of their royalties because they
don’t want to see the interrelations in all the performances
of the human mind.
 We want to see those interrelations only on a very
small scale — but in the center scale where the structural
conditions and powers of the human mind really work; and
we consider people who got very suspicious of power itself
for the first time. The first of them was Lao-tze, and it
continues up to Jesus of Nazareth. Everyone of them was
very suspicious of power. They didn’t really know what they
meant by it but they had the opinion — they all had the op-
inion there must be something wrong with power until Socrates
finally said: ›Oh, you see the question is quite simple:
of course knowledge is power, but this power leads us straight
into catastrophe because there is a hidden power that brings
this power about — that is the power to control this power.
You can learn as much as you want. You will be a very power-
ful man, but the decision whether you use your power rightly
or not — that means whether you become creative or destruc-
tive — is not given to the power itself.‹ Or as I would say :
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It is the question of being a power or having power; it is
human to have power and to use it rightly — it is quite in-
human to be one’s self a power: namely, the representative
of a power, a mere function. In that sense Stalin was quite
a powerless man; one of the most powerless that ever lived.
So was Hitler, in the human sense. They were powers but they
didn’t have power. Somebody who has power can get rid of
power; he doesn’t need a special assemblance of power every
day.
 This power thirst of our modern times is nothing but
the power factuality of mythical times and those people whom
we consider protested against this factuality of power. They
were the first who got very distrustful of this merely
mechanical thing — which is the performance of the human
intellect and nothing else — in imagination or in science
— wherever. The question is: ›Where is the controlling
instance in man?‹ ›Can he be himself the controlling in-
stance, not to lose that center?‹ Many people say that, that
a certain loss of center occurred in our time. We now know
approximately why. The last center we really had was a reli-
gious one; then we destroyed philosophy and looked down upon
it. Now we have to find the center in ourselves because
there is no other center left — in the real independence of
the structure of the human mind. If we do not find it then
we have lost the center forever.
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 That is here the purpose and in that sense we start in
the next session with making a transition from our previous
discussion to the situation of Lao-tze. The transition will
be that we have to clear up one last abstract question.
That is: Is here a difference between the individual and
the person? What is an individual and what is a person?
What could be considered to be a human person and what would
we say a human individual is? And then again: What is society
and what is community? Are there differences? In order to
know what we are talking about when we are handling those
people we have to make those distinctions because those were
distinctions they had and which have been forgotten in the
meantime with the development of metaphysics which identified
those terms. We have to split them up again in order to find
out what their original meaning might have been and perhaps
we can agree that we ourselves need this original meaning
much more than the mix-up which we had in the meantime of
those terms. Many of the political questions of our time
are muddled because we do not have distinctions like that.
The question of freedom itself is ruined by the identifica-
tion of the individual with the person. Individual freedom
can only mean license. It is anarchistic freedom. Freedom
of society can also only mean license and no freedom whatso-
ever.
 Here is the reason I said once before that we have had
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a very funny history. Since the 18th Century we have fought
battles for freedom, and we have raised one flag of freedom
after the other, and we brought ourselves one step nearer to
slavery. We lost almost every one of those battles of free-
dom except one: the one in the United States of which we do
not know how it will end. But this battle is still in full
swing. Everywhere else in the world we have lost it. We
have under the flag of freedom introduced features like, for
instance, the totalitarian society in the Soviet Union. That
was one of our greatest struggles for freedom. We thought
we had the right flag. We will have to ask: Did we know
what we were talking about when we talked at those times about
freedom? — or were we merely emotional? Were we perhaps
so emotional about freedom that we didn’t even care to look
into the conditions for freedom? What are the conditions
of freedom? This is one of our main concerns here because
freedom is not political freedom. Political freedom is a de-
rivate from freedom and it can never really be established
if we lose the capacities that build freedom — and those are
the capacities we are after in this course. That means free-
dom and truth are either identical — or both are not.
 So we have the question: ›Why is freedom the concern
of philosophy suddenly?‹ It has never been the concern of
philosophy before. Not of any metaphysical [philosopher]. He
was like the scientist: only really interested in necessity
— to show us that everything has to be as it is because he
can show the reasons for it. With Kant for the first time
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since Socrates’ death or Jesus’ death the question has been
raised again: ›Is not perhaps freedom and not necessity the
main concern of real philosophy?‹ That is also the start of
so-called nihilistic thinking. Nihilistic thinking has one
big asset in modern times, and that is that those people
really cared for freedom; they really wanted to know what it
is, how we could use it. The question is on again. That
makes one more connection again between the eldest and the
youngest thinkers and one more reason why we leave out every-
thing in between because there the dualistic problem of
necessity and freedom has been handled. The last word of
all metaphysical thinking was that freedom is nothing but
insight into necessity: that means that we not only take
for granted what we have to do anyway, but that in addition
to everything else, we have to do it enthusiastically — with
a big emotion, finding ourselves in the most wonderful posi-
tion on earth because we can do enthusiastically what we must
do. This is a strange proposition which has never been made
before. When people taught other people that they must or
should do things — at least they didn’t ask them in addi-
tion to everything else to enjoy that situation. We are asked
in addition to enjoy it, to feel fine about it. We are sup-
posed to be automatons dancing around and singing, ›Oh, how
nice it is that we are automatons. What a wonderful life
to be an automaton.‹ And this is just a little bit too much!
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 Former masters, non-metaphysicians — metaphysicians
but not metaphysicians in the scientific sense — gave us at
least a chance and said, ›God says you should do that,‹ —
if you don’t it might be hell, if you do it that’s fine, but
it doesn’t mean that now you are someone who can feel especi-
ally wonderful. They never made a proposition like that to
us. Here come masters around to tell us: You are, so to
speak, nothing. You have to move according to certain condi-
tions and to those conditions only. And if you do, if you
are able to do that — that is the highest performance of
human life — then you are a real dancer, then you can really
behave. That is a very very funny proposition and it is in
the world since Hegel. Marx only took it up and the modern
scientists only take it up. The invention is the invention
of a great metaphysician who told us: ›Enjoy what you must
do‹ I think, on the contrary, (and so did Kant and Nietzsche
especially) that the joy of human life seems rather to lie in
freedom, in what we want to do if we can justify it by good
reason — and only then — and by free reasoning for the
sake of the world. If we achieve the slightest step in that
direction, then perhaps we are really entitled to say: ›Well,
that we did slightly all right. Let’s feel a little bit fine
about it and drink a glass of wine‹. But not if we did what
any ox has to do, too: namely, to obey orders — be they even
the orders of the cosmos.
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 In the same condition have those great thinkers been.
For Buddha, for instance, it dawned suddenly in the middle
of the Indian mythical world that he had not been asked —
that he had never been asked to do. He was supposed to.
And to break out of this framework of doing things, so to
speak, not automatically but in a dream — things that were
like a dreamlike performance. You were a prince and as a
prince you had to do that and you did it and you lived your
life as a prince. And then it suddenly occurred to this man:
that means not a lead a human life — and he broke in the
legend even literally the walls of that supposition. He
went out on his own in order to see things which he was not
supposed to see: namely, that men grow old and weak, that
men die, the experience of death. He had to look for all
that by himself because he was not told. It did not belong
to the things he had to take for granted. And so he broke
through all those conditions by himself and started asking
questions. So did Lao-tze. Beginning to ask questions of
the world.
 The question, ›Why?‹ — which is the source of all
questions — can be called the ultimate question. The ul-
timate question, perhaps never answerable but always to be
raised, is three-fold. It really means: ›What is the mean-
ing of being?‹ ›What is the value of human life — if any?’
and, ›Who is man?‹ This is the three-fold content of the
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one question, ›Why?‹ — What is the meaning of being, if
there is any? What is the value of human life, if there
is any? And, who is man to ask those questions? The ques-
tion is in itself critical; it contains in itself already
questioning the question — namely, to ask what we asked be-
fore: Are we really entitled to ask this question — or is
it merely an illusion of ours? Is there any real capability
in us that justifies us to play the judges of the world, to
ask those questions — Why the why? And that is the third
part of this indication: namely, Who is man? Who are we
anyhow — to put it in the American fashion — to ask ques-
tions like that.
 This ›Who are we anyhow to ask questions like that?‹
is the pre-condition for asking those questions to the world.
Those people did it — they asked the questions. The first
of them — and almost the last — who got the idea that
there might be something wrong with just naively asking those
questions was Socrates, who tried to question the question
and asked first: Do we have any real capability to ask that
question, or is that just a joke our mind plays on us by
reflection? We think we can ask questions; we really can-
not. What is questioning itself? And by that the discovery
of reason as a basic human capability was made.
 Up to this discovery of reason from which all our
other capabilities derive we have to lead this course in or-
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der to get ground under our feet and to answer finally per-
haps: Is there a chance really for freedom? — or are we con-
demned always only to talk about it? Can we achieve it? Can
we at least contribute to it? In the most ruthless manner
this questioning has been taken up again by modern nihilistic
thinkers. Dostoyevsky did it in ›Brothers Karamazov‹, when
Ivan tells his brother, Alyosha, who is a believer: ›I have
seen a little girl of five years punished by her parents,
kept in a dark icy room all night and I have heard her cry
all night and I tell you one thing, you believer: I want
to ask your God only one question: namely, if he thinks
that thing can be justified and is contained in the so-called
necessary development of his beautiful cosmos. If it is,
then I will give back my ticket to this show. I don’t like
it! Either you can show me that we have the slightest chance
— even on that I would live — to change those things;
but as long as you will come here and tell me that in some
possible hereafter everything will be justified, I say. No!
because even eternal bliss for this child and for myself
would never erase out of my memory this experience. I do
not like it! I do not want the world to be like that!‹4
 Here for the last time in modern times somebody spoke
up and said: ›We want to make up our minds what shall be and
what shall not be because we want a world that we consider
to be just and if we cannot have it we will give back our
4 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor: The Brothers Karamazov, 1880, V, § 4.
Heinrich Blücher – Papers 
Box 2, Folder 8
Bard College (Annandale-on-Hudson), Stevenson Library




admission ticket.‹ That was nihilistic thinking — and it is
not nihilistic. It only means to raise the question in the
sharpest manner again. Dostoyevsky was not really a nihil-
ist — no nihilist would write novels. He had enough hope.
An artist is always safe not being a nihilist, but to think
that way is very helpful to us because we want to find out:
Has man a right to raise questions like that? Is he able
to change conditions or is he merely conditioned? If we
should find he is able to change conditions, and to condition
himself in the first place, then we might have a lead that
life might be worthwhile to be live in the sense of this ori-
ginal question, the ultimate question: ›What is the meaning
of being, if there is any?‹ ›What is the value of human
life, if there is any?‹ And, ›Who is man anyhow to ask those
questions?‹
